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The complexities of climate finance
Over the years of negotiations leading up to COP15 
– the 2009 Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
in Copenhagen, Denmark – assistance from richer 
countries to help poorer ones adopt low-carbon 
pathways of development was seen as a key way of 
rebuilding trust and cooperation on climate change. 
Such so-called ‘climate finance’ was also slated to help 
developing countries adapt to climate impacts.
Chaotic as COP15 ultimately was, it produced an accord 
(see ‘What is the Copenhagen Accord?’, overleaf). One 
element of this is a promise of climate finance, starting at 
US$10 billion a year from 2010 to 2012, increasing to 
US$100 billion by 2020. The numbers look impressive, 
but the ‘devil is in the details’. Six big questions need to 
be asked about the Copenhagen promises.
What are the sources of funding?
The funding sources mooted are said to include both 
private and public. However, the inclusion of private 
funding sources could completely change the actual 
meaning of the figures. If US$1 billion of public funding 
is shifting US$9 billion of foreign direct investment from 
coal to renewable energy, is this called ‘US$10 billion of 
climate finance from public and private sources’?1   
One clear promise emerged from the confusion of the 2009 climate talks 
in Copenhagen. This was to provide short- and long-term ‘climate finance’ 
to help developing countries – especially the most vulnerable – adapt to 
climate impacts. The promise seemed simple enough: wealthier nations 
would pledge US$10 billion a year from 2010-2012, ramping up to 
US$100 billion a year starting in 2020. This was also touted as a way to 
help developing countries avoid high-carbon pathways of development by 
adopting lower-emitting power sources such as solar or natural gas. But a 
closer look at the Copenhagen promise unearths at least six big questions 
– any one of which could seriously challenge the trust these funds were 
designed to build.
Apart from private investment, the volume of climate 
finance might be further stretched if financial flows from 
carbon trading, such as through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, are included.  
However, buying carbon credits from developing 
countries cannot be seen as triggering additional 
emission reductions overall, as those credits are used to 
comply with carbon targets that developed countries are 
setting themselves.  
Finally, the CDM was a key part of the deal in Kyoto,2 
so CDM flows until 2012 should not be called ‘new and 
additional’ – that is, on top of previously delivered and 
promised foreign assistance. Future mechanisms in the 
carbon market may be even more prone to double-
counting if they are not internationally administered 
and if national governments set the rules for offsets and 
climate finance themselves.
Is it new and additional?
Developing countries insist that the Copenhagen pledges 
be ‘new and additional’ because they are concerned 
that aid would otherwise be diverted away from crucial 
needs such as health care, education, agriculture and 
safety.3 But it is extremely difficult to establish this.  
No baseline year was specified from which the  
US$100 billion a year pledged would be additional.  
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Also unspecified was how a baseline would be  
set – as a single-year amount of aid, or an average of 
several years?   
Assessing the additionality of funds is even more difficult, 
as there is substantial overlap between climate change 
projects and typical development aid. 
Particularly in the case of adaptation 
projects, many of the actions taken to 
prepare for climate impacts are identical 
to those many countries have been 
putting into practice for years. Diversifying 
economies, shifting from drought-sensitive crops, 
building irrigation systems, moving wells away from salty 
groundwater along coasts – all of these make sense both 
as adaptation and as projects enabling development.  In 
fact, some experts and practitioners have argued that 
good development is the same as good adaptation. This, 
however, is an extremely broad view of adaptation, and 
critics may argue that it renders any accounting of new 
and additional funding nearly impossible.  
Distinguishing between old ‘development projects’ and 
new ‘mitigation projects’ counted under Copenhagen 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is also surprisingly 
difficult. Since the energy crises in 1973 and 1978, 
countries in the developing world have received 
assistance from national aid agencies such as USAID 
and German development bank KfW, and international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank, for projects 
like shifting coal-fired power plants to natural gas.4 
Are new instances of these same projects suddenly 
promoted because of climate change therefore new and 
additional? Seemingly some would need to be included 
in the baseline above which new and additional funds 
would be counted.  
Who decides?
Another crucial element in deciding how climate finance 
is defined is who is responsible for the defining. Just 
before COP15, a proposal was made by members 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (the DAC). They proposed that climate 
funding could be captured with their so-called ‘Rio 
Markers’ system to categorise mitigation projects, 
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What is the Copenhagen accord? 
The Copenhagen Accord is an international agreement among 25 nations attending the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP15). The 193 countries at COP15 agreed to ‘take 
note’ of the Accord. It includes all the major issues debated in the negotiations leading to the event – such as 
mitigation, adaptation, financing and technology – but is not legally binding like the Kyoto Protocol or other 
treaties. Paragraphs 8 to 10 cover finance.
8.	 	Scaled	up,	new	and	additional,	predictable	and	adequate	funding	as	well	as	improved	access	shall	be	
provided	to	developing	countries,	in	accordance	with	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	Convention,	to	enable	
and	support	enhanced	action	on	mitigation,	including	substantial	finance	to	reduce	emissions	from	
deforestation	and	forest	degradation	(REDD-plus),	adaptation,	technology	development	and	transfer	
and	capacity-building,	for	enhanced	implementation	of	the	Convention.	The	collective	commitment	
by	developed	countries	is	to	provide	new	and	additional	resources,	including	forestry	and	investments	
through	international	institutions,	approaching	USD	30	billion	for	the	period	2010	to	2012	with	balanced	
allocation	between	adaptation	and	mitigation.	Funding	for	adaptation	will	be	prioritized	for	the	most	
vulnerable	developing	countries,	such	as	the	least	developed	countries,	small	island	developing	States	and	
Africa.	In	the	context	of	meaningful	mitigation	actions	and	transparency	on	implementation,	developed	
countries	commit	to	a	goal	of	mobilizing	jointly	USD	100	billion	dollars	a	year	by	2020	to	address	the	
needs	of	developing	countries.	This	funding	will	come	from	a	wide	variety	of	sources,	public	and	private,	
bilateral	and	multilateral,	including	alternative	sources	of	finance.	New	multilateral	funding	for	adaptation	
will	be	delivered	through	effective	and	efficient	fund	arrangements,	with	a	governance	structure	providing	
for	equal	representation	of	developed	and	developing	countries.	A	significant	portion	of	such	funding	
should	flow	through	the	Copenhagen	Green	Climate	Fund.
9.	 	To	this	end,	a	High	Level	Panel	will	be	established	under	the	guidance	of	and	accountable	to	the	
Conference	of	the	Parties	to	study	the	contribution	of	the	potential	sources	of	revenue,	including	
alternative	sources	of	finance,	towards	meeting	this	goal.		
10.		We	decide	that	the	Copenhagen	Green	Climate	Fund	shall	be	established	as	an	operating	entity	of	the	
financial	mechanism	of	the	Convention	to	support	projects,	programme,	policies	and	other	activities	in	
developing	countries	related	to	mitigation	including	REDD-plus,	adaptation,	capacity-building,	technology	
development	and	transfer.
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and their new ‘Adaptation Markers’ to track new and 
additional funding.5  
These markers are quite simple labels, categorising a 
project as having climate change as its ‘principal’ or 
as a ‘significant’ objective. There must be a broader 
international agreement on whether either or both of 
these categories allow a project to count as ‘new and 
additional’; probably comprehensive lists of types of 
projects that can be counted in each category will need 
to be developed. Most of all, there needs to be much 
more inclusive understanding and discussion about the 
way the markers categorise projects.  
And who categorises each project? Under the OECD 
DAC system, donors define their own projects as 
climate-related or not. In some donor agencies, project 
managers assign these codes – allowing someone with 
good knowledge to make the decision. However, each 
may have different ways of interpreting ‘climate-related’. 
Some agencies have a central office ‘DAC reporter’ or 
staff assigning codes to projects. These reporters are 
often overworked and under-resourced, and may be 
under pressure to determine spending in each category 
to satisfy the ‘new and additional’ criterion.
Grants or loans?
The Accord is unclear on whether the promised new 
climate finance includes mostly grants, or also a major 
fraction of loans. 
This is important: many loans extended by major 
international agencies like the International Monetary 
Fund are not that different from commercial sector 
loans. Will the calculus of ‘new and additional funding’ 
only count the ‘concessional’ portion of the loan – the 
extent to which the terms beat commercial loans 
these countries could get? (This is called the ‘grant 
element’ by the OECD DAC.) Or will traditional official 
development assistance (ODA) accounting rules apply, 
where the full amount is counted when it is dispersed, 
but then accounts to zero once fully paid back?  
Most analyses use only the ‘commitments’, and do not 
subtract the repayments. The risk is that by counting 
loans as part of climate finance, what is actually being 
counted is funds that flow back to lenders. Depending 
on the definition, US$10 billion of new climate finance 
may actually mean very little additional support.  
How predictable?
There are also issues of predictability and pace of 
implementation. How long will it take for developing 
countries to receive first funds from the Copenhagen 
promises? Looking at past experience with ODA and 
climate funding, it may take several years to disburse 
even the ‘fast track’ finance promised for 2010 to 2012. 
So financing sources independent of short-term politics, 
as well as an efficient approval process, are needed.
The push for aid transparency
The new International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is now working on common 
information standards for all aid flows, covering: 
1.   agreement on what will be published, for example detailed project information, expected 
outputs and outcomes, and conditions
2.  common definitions for sharing information, to enable better comparability between 
donors and countries
3.   a common electronic data format, that will facilitate the sharing of aid information, and 
reduce transaction costs
4.   a code of conduct setting out what donors commit to publishing, how this will be made 
available, and how donors will be held accountable for compliance.
Which channels?
Regarding the pace of implementation, what agencies 
will be making the key decisions, and will they be 
effective and streamlined in granting the go-ahead for 
climate projects? Fair governance systems for these 
long-awaited climate funds – and equitable policies for 
their dispersal – are critical for their legitimacy among 
developing nations.6 
Two essential tasks 
All six questions call for two essential tasks to be 
fulfilled on an international level.
n  There must be clarity and broad agreement about 
the definition of what the billions in climate finance 
actually stand for, especially how much will be 
public money; how ‘new and additional’ is to be 
defined; and how concessional loans have to be in 
order to count. 
n  Transparency, oversight and evaluation on how 
much is actually paid, where the funding is going 
and what it is being used for will be critical to the 
sustainability of these funds. Certainly there will 
need to be a registry with rules set by the parties 
to the UNFCCC, as well as an Oversight Board (or 
High Level Panel, as set out in the Accord – see 
paragraph 9 in ‘What is the Copenhagen Accord?’, 
opposite).
However, the mandate of this panel is only to study, not 
to verify or enforce climate finance. 
Following clear guidelines such as the ones under the 
new International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) 
– which seeks to bring donors together with developing 
countries’ governments, civil society organisations and 
others to agree common standards on information 
regarding all aid flows – could help the panel (as well 
as people in the financing chain) to understand what 
is being done where, and what the money is meant 
to be spent on (see ‘The push for aid transparency’). 
If the pledges are not being met, there needs to be a 
mechanism to effectively raise and distribute more funds.
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Transparency, oversight and evaluation are also 
warranted for the performance of the financed projects. 
So major improvements in existing practice are needed, 
as the performance of existing internationally funded 
mitigation and adaptation projects is not well charted.  
A valuable initial effort would be to systematically 
review which past projects classified as mitigation 
and adaptation actually resulted in real and additional 
mitigation and adaptation activities. Rigorous 
independent evaluation of project outcomes, connected 
to systems to reprioritise those types of projects that 
are most successful, could drive major improvements in 
climate finance. 
financing a future
The six points raised here suggest that the bare figures 
in the Copenhagen Accord mean little for the future of  
climate financing. These climate finance flows must 
be further distinguished from other flows, especially 
regarding additionality, public or private flows, timing 
and authority. 
A new system of oversight also needs to be created 
under UN guidance in coordination with the OECD DAC, 
to guarantee the needed transparency. The oversight 
should consist of both a registry as well as an Oversight 
Board with a broader mandate than the High Level 
Panel as it was set out in the Accord. That mandate 
needs to include impact evaluation, verification  
and enforcement.
And how much funding will be needed to help 
developing countries address climate change? This  
is a tough call, but any prediction must address two sets 
of needs. 
On the one hand, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 
particular have to adapt to devastating climate impacts 
such as sea-level rise, droughts, flooding and rising 
temperatures. On the other hand, if humanity is going to 
avoid the worst of these impacts, developing countries 
need to mitigate their emissions by following a low-
carbon development path.  
To do this while meeting their needs for growth 
demands major energy efficiency measures, switching 
to low-carbon energy sources, or reducing deforestation. 
While the need for climate finance in developing 
countries is disputed, it is estimated to amount to 
US$100-250 billion a year by 2030 (see Table below).
Table. Recent estimates of international climate finance
Annual funding needs, 2005  
(billions of dollars)  
Source Year Mitigation Adaptation 
EC  
(2009)
2020 94* 10-24
African Group 
(2009)
2020 200 >67
World Bank  
(2009)
2030 139-175 20-100
UNFCCC  
(2008)
2030 >65 28-59
* However, only US$12-26 billion should come from international  
public funding, while the rest would come from developing countries and 
carbon markets.
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